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EU: implications for UK climate policy’. 
 
Introduction 
 
1. This is a submission by the ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy 
and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science to the House of Commons Energy 
and Climate Change Committee inquiry on ‘Leaving the EU: implications for UK 
climate policy’.  
 
2. This submission outlines the latest research evidence from the ESRC Centre for 
Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate 
Change and the Environment focusing on the question: ‘What should be the 
Government’s priorities on the EU Emissions Trading System when negotiating the 
UK’s exit from the EU? What would a successful negotiation outcome look like?’ 
 
 
What should be the Government’s priorities on the EU Emissions Trading System when 
negotiating the UK’s exit from the EU? What would a successful negotiation outcome look 
like? 
 
1. Following the UK’s decision to leave the EU, its participation in the Union’s flagship 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is subject to negotiation. In this submission, we 
argue that the EU ETS has been beneficial for the UK, and maintaining the UK’s 
participation in the system should be a priority in its negotiations to leave the EU. 
  
2. Using insights from recent original research (Doda and Taschini, 2016)., our analysis 
reviews the economic benefits and costs of two options against maintaining the 
status quo: 
 
a. Implementing a UK ETS in isolation;  
b. Implementing a UK ETS with a view to linking it to other ETS’s.  
 
Implementing a UK ETS in isolation  
 
3. Emissions trading is a cost-effective way of distributing the economic burden of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions across regulated businesses in a country. 
Essentially, the EU ETS is a system of linked country-level ETSs. It allows permit 
transactions across borders and creates additional cost saving opportunities 
unavailable in an isolated ETS (Flachsland et al., 2009 and Jaffe et al., 2009).  
 
4. These potential costs savings are larger, the larger the market (i.e. where more or 
bigger countries participate) because firms in countries where it is expensive to 
reduce emissions can buy surplus permits from firms in counties where reductions 
can be made more cheaply.  
 
5. By participating in a linked system, a small country tends to capture the bulk of the 
cost savings. This is because the potential for cost savings is not diminished when 
small countries access the linked system to buy and sell permits. In contrast, when 
large countries join the linked system, their purchase and sales decisions influence 
the market price in a way that can limit the potential for cost savings. 
 
6. Currently, the EU ETS is the world’s largest market for emission permits. According 
to European Environment Agency data, between 2013 and 2015, approximately 11 
per cent of the greenhouse gas emissions regulated under the EU ETS originated 
from UK installations. The UK is therefore a relatively small partner in the system 
compared to Germany, which accounted for approximately 25 per cent of emissions 
over the same period. Consequently, implementing a UK ETS in isolation implies a 
greater burden of regulation for the UK economy as many cost saving opportunities 
will cease to exist following a withdrawal from the EU ETS. For example, low-cost 
abatement opportunities from eastern European countries would not be available 
any longer. Conversely, where permits held by UK firms are relatively cheap because 
demand in a booming Member State economy is high, mutually beneficial 
transactions would not take place. 
 
7. In fact between 2013 and 2015 the UK was allocated less permits on the primary 
market (auctions and free allocations) than its verified emissions, leaving a shortfall 
in each year. Some of the shortfall is likely to have been made up by permits banked 
in previous years; the remainder would have been bought on the secondary market 
(i.e. bought directly from other firms or via a trading exchange or broker). Without 
access to the EU ETS, the permits bought on the secondary market are likely to have 
been much more expensive. In other years, for example from 2009 to 2012, the UK 
had a surplus of permits which UK firms had the option to sell to non-UK firms or 
bank. This option would be severely limited if the UK leaves the EU ETS. 
 
Implementing a UK-ETS with a view to linking it to other ETSs 
 
8. Setting up a new UK ETS and linking it to others is likely to be costly.  Linking can 
imply substantial negotiation costs to harmonize the systems’ key design features. 
There is also likely to be costs incurred setting up the financial, legal and 
administrative infrastructures to facilitate the transactions between ETSs. So, if the 
UK were to set up a new ETS and then try to link with, for example, the California-
Quebec cap-and-trade system, the UK would effectively have to negotiate a costly 
carbon ‘trade deal’. 
     
9. A large portion of these costs are sunk in nature which the UK has already incurred 
when it became part of the EU ETS. Viewed in this light, even if the UK can form a 
new link with another ETS quickly, it will probably be inferior to the status quo. First, 
a new set of sunk costs must be incurred and these costs are likely much higher with 
non-European linking partners because they are likely to be institutionally dissimilar 
to the UK.  
 
10. Second, currently there is no market that is comparable in size to EU ETS, even after 
excluding the UK, which limits the magnitude of potential cost savings.  
 
11. Third, although new, larger ETSs are in the pipeline (e.g. a national ETS in China is 
expected in 2017), linking with systems that have not matured may come with its 
own difficulties. More importantly, larger systems stand to gain more from linking 
with other large systems. In other words, although pursuing a new large partner may 
be an attractive option for the UK, it is unlikely to be a priority for the large partner.   
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